

Coercion and Land Power

A Monograph

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## ABSTRACT

COERCION AND LAND POWER.

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OPERATION ALLIED FORCE has become a lightning rod sparking strong debate within the US military. The debate revolves around the subject of decisive military action and which branch of service most contributed to the successful campaign in Kosovo. Air power enthusiasts proclaim operations in Kosovo as further vindication of the supremacy of air power. Land power enthusiasts posit that it was the contribution of land power that delivered the decisive blow in Kosovo. Useful lessons learned are obscured by parochial diatribe. Anachronistic debate between the two polarized communities obscures insight into OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

Operations in Kosovo require a new perspective in which to examine actions and extract useful lessons learned. The best perspective for doing so is from the standpoint of coercion strategy. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a coercion campaign. During a coercion campaign, the military simply backs diplomacy with force. That force is measured and applied to achieve limited and quantifiable results. Coercion does not require decisive military force.

The question that this monograph answers is does land power provide a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion. An examination of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE from the perspective of coercion develops a deeper understanding of coercion strategy. It reveals empirical data from historical examples, explores coercion's role in US military doctrine, and reveals useful lessons learned while simultaneously discarding the dogmatic arguments of air and land power enthusiasts.

The monograph concludes that land power is relevant in coercion campaigns. Success or failure of land power in one situation will not necessarily predict the same result in other situations. However, because coercion holds a pivotal role in United States foreign policy, the US Army should re-examine its role in a non-decisive sense in order to back diplomacy with limited power.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Council's (NATO) successful campaign in Kosovo, was a lightning rod which attracted strong debate within the United States (US) military. The debate was between the proponents of both air and land power. The subject of the debate was decisive military action. The argument was which branch of service was the most decisive contributor to OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.<sup>1</sup>

Air power enthusiasts proclaimed OPERATION ALLIED FORCE as further vindication of the supremacy of air power. Intellectuals, including the respected historian John Keegan, and senior military leaders, including the operation's air component commander US Air Force Lieutenant General Short, posited that OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was the acme of air power operations. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE served as an example of air power solely obtaining the stated goals and objectives of a military campaign.<sup>2</sup> The contribution of land power was negligible.

The subject of the air power enthusiasts' lessons learned was to find the best way to optimize air power. From their perspective, OPERATION ALLIED FORCE served as the first example where air power alone decided the contest's

outcome. The most important lessons would therefore focus on making air power more decisive.

On the other side of the debate were the advocates of the supremacy of land power over air power. The defenders of land power argued that decisive military action was obtainable only through the use of ground forces.

Intellectuals, including Ivo Daalder at The Brookings Institution, and military leaders, including NATO's Supreme Commander US Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, posited that the application of land power was decisive in Kosovo. It was land power that successfully concluded OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.<sup>3</sup> They relegated air power to a subordinate, though highly important, role. The most important lessons would therefore focus on making land power more decisive. These pedantic arguments obscured some useful lessons learned from OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. The land power and air power communities remain polarized. The US military is mired in the anachronistic debate of air power versus land power, just as they were during OPERATION DESERT STORM.<sup>4</sup> The relevance of land power in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE is lost in a provincial argument over which service was the most decisive. Is there a method of examining the relevance of land power in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE and still avoid parochial debate? Will this examination reveal a new set of lessons learned?

Coercion strategy provides this new method for measuring land power's relevance during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. General Clark stated that Allied Force was, from the beginning, a strategy of coercion.<sup>5</sup> An examination of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE should begin by using a methodology founded on the principles of coercion strategy. Coercion provides a framework to correctly measure land power's relevance, success, and failure.

Does land power provide a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion? Measuring success and failure from the perspective of coercion reveals the relevance of land power while simultaneously discarding the dogmatic arguments of air and land power enthusiasts. Studying the relevance of land power within a strategy of coercion will lead to a set of lessons learned that is unblemished by parochial debate.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE can provide military planners with a richer understanding of the strategy of coercion. What is the definition of coercion? What characteristics distinguish coercion from other types of actions? What are the key tasks of coercion? What are some examples of coercion strategies? What is the role of coercion in US military doctrine? Was coercion successful during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE? How did land power contribute to coercion? This approach "sheds" more light on the subjects of land

power and coercion strategy while reducing the "heat" surrounding the discussion of which branch of service, either air power or land power, is the most decisive.<sup>6</sup>

## CHAPTER TWO

### COERCION THEORY

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE began on 24 March 1999. During a conference presentation at the University of Chicago on 4 August 1999, General Clark stated that the operation "was to be coercion, diplomacy backed by threat."<sup>7</sup> What is the academic definition of coercion? Is coercion the act of backing diplomacy with a threat?

The meaning of coercion is found in several sources. A dictionary provides a start by stating a succinct definition. An examination of academic theory enriches coercion's simple definition. Coercion theory provides an ability to determine the characteristics of coercion in order to distinguish it from other types of actions.<sup>8</sup> Two examples of coercion strategy can help refine understanding.

#### **Coercion Defined**

Webster's New World Dictionary defines the term coerce as "to restrain or constrain by force; curb."<sup>9</sup> The second definition is "to force; compel."<sup>10</sup> The difference between the two definitions is subtle. There is a fine distinction



between the terms restraining, constraining, and forcing. The dictionary is essentially stating that coercion is passive in nature. Coercion is an act to restrain as opposed to an act to force. Coercion constrains by force instead of overwhelming with force. Does this passive nature extend into the academic theory of coercion?

### **Coercion Theory**

Alexander L. George, professor emeritus of international relations at Stanford University, identifies some general characteristics of coercion. According to George, coercion intends "to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than to bludgeon him into stopping."<sup>11</sup> Coercion is demonstrating the willingness to escalate to higher levels of pain. Coercion avoids relying on the blunt use of military force. If actual force must be used to help persuade, then that force is "in the form of quite limited military action".<sup>12</sup> Coercion is therefore a warning. It is an act to convince an opponent rather than an act to force an opponent. The intent of coercion is to back up a demand on an adversary with a "threat of punishment".<sup>13</sup> The method of punishment is just enough to warrant compliance. The use of punishment is "credible and potent enough to persuade" the opponent "that it is in his interest to comply with the demand."<sup>14</sup> George's characteristics of coercion are passive in nature; identical with the simple definition listed in a

dictionary. Where does coercion strategy originate?

The origin of coercion strategy is in the diplomatic realm. According to Timothy R. Sample, Executive Director of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, coercion is "only one" of several actions available for obtaining "international objectives."<sup>15</sup> Sample uses the analogy of a quiver of arrows to describe coercion. Each arrow, or action, in the quiver has its own unique attributes suitable for different circumstances. Coercion is available for use when called upon. Coercion is just one of the actions available in the quiver. An analogy to avoid using when describing coercion is the rungs of a ladder. The ladder analogy implies a hierarchy of actions available for obtaining objectives. Each rung of the ladder represents the evolutionary progression of actions. According to Sample, the ladder analogy is an incorrect conceptual model.

Sample describes coercion as one of the four arrows available in the foreign policy quiver. The four arrows, or types of actions, are coercion, intervention, influence, and covert actions. These actions attempt to change or modify a target government's behavior. Coercion is effective when there is a need to significantly change the behavior of an adversary. From this perspective, coercion is "inflicting the type of pain that forces a government to submit to our wishes."<sup>16</sup> General Clark's definition of coercion is

therefore correct and accurate from the perspective of academic theory.<sup>17</sup>

Sample defines influence as an action that affects a target government in a good-natured or kindly manner. The target government requires and then asks for help. A target government requests influence. They need assistance. Michael Bayles, professor of philosophy at the University of Kentucky, provides a definition that is helpful in distinguishing coercion from influence. According to Bayles, "coercion usually involves a threat of harm and never involves a promise of benefit."<sup>18</sup> Coercion connotes pain; influence provides assistance.

Covert action is another method to achieve an objective. Sample states that covert action affects a target government without the knowledge or permission of that government. The target government is unaware that an action is taking place or even who is responsible for the action; coercion is open diplomacy backed by force.

According to Sample, intervention is the direct involvement in a country's affairs. Intervention uses any combination of diplomatic, informational, military and economic power. Intervention spans the full range of military operations from peacekeeping to warfare. It can also include financial backing of political parties or public support for opposition candidates in a target

government.

James Roche and George Pickett of the Northrop Corporation describe intervention in a similar manner. They define intervention as "a deliberate intrusion of force into a sovereign nation."<sup>19</sup> They consider combat as the most destructive form of intervention. The United State's intervention in Somalia in 1993-1994 is an example of intervention.<sup>20</sup> It was intervening with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation in order to instill our will upon the nation. Other examples of intervention are trade sanctions, foreign aid, or political pressure. Intervention is direct involvement and application of pain; coercion threatens the application of just enough pain.

Deterrence is another arrow available for use in the foreign policy quiver. Robert A. Pape, assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College, lists deterrence as another type of action available for obtaining goals and objectives. Pape states that deterrence can be thought of as the "flip-side" of coercion.<sup>21</sup> Deterrence is more defensive in nature than coercion, intervention, influence, or covert action. This is because deterrence "seeks to maintain the status quo by discouraging" a target government from changing its behavior.<sup>22</sup> Deterrence is an action that keeps an opponent's behavior the same as it was yesterday; coercion "seeks to force the opponent to alter its

behavior."<sup>23</sup>

Theory provides both the definition of coercion and a formula for success. Why does coercion succeed on some occasions and yet fail in others? What are the key tasks that can logically prescribe coercion's success or failure?<sup>24</sup> According to George, there are four key tasks that are a "framework that can serve as a starting point."<sup>25</sup>

#### **Task One: Determine Strategy Variables**

What is the reason for coercing a target government? The first key task of coercion strategy determines several strategy variables that clarify coercion's objective. The first variable is to determine what to demand on the opponent. George states that it is the diplomat who decides what to demand. Research indicates that this is the most important variable.<sup>26</sup> Determining what to demand delineates the purpose of the coercion.

George states that the second variable is to determine how to create a sense of urgency for compliance by the opponent. Coercion places a clear and succinct time limit on the opponent. Diplomatic signaling provides additional incentives for compliance. Coercion urges compliance by perpetuating the threat of ever-increasing levels of punishment.

The third variable is to determine the method of punishment. George states that this crucial variable

identifies more than just the type of punishment. This variable also orchestrates the delivery of punishment. Identifying the optimal method of punishment enhances coercion's credibility.

The fourth variable is to determine other inducements. This variable takes into account political realities and to leave options open for the opponent. George believes that a face-saving concession can benefit both parties because of its practicality. Options from trivial concessions to monumental settlements can significantly enhance coercion strategies, however; coercion must always include the threat of pain and never solely rely on a promise of benefit. With the first key task accomplished, there is fidelity in precisely defining the reason for coercion.

#### **Task Two: Select the Form of Coercion**

The form provides precision in the way to go about coercing the target government. George identifies several forms of coercion from which to select. Discussion of the four forms of coercion begins, in order, from the most potent to the least potent.

The first form of coercion is the classic ultimatum. The classic ultimatum is the starkest on the spectrum of options. A classic ultimatum is a simple demand, a succinct time limit to induce a sense of urgency on the opponent, and harsh punishment with zero tolerance for noncompliance.

The second form of coercion is the tacit ultimatum. The tacit ultimatum is somewhat less stark than the classic ultimatum. This form of coercion is also more flexible than the classic ultimatum. The reason is that two variables, creating a sense of urgency and type of punishment, are less important. Therefore, coercion is not cast upon a predetermined course of action as in the classic ultimatum.

The third form is incremental coercion. Incremental coercion relies on the threat of gradually incrementing the level of pressure right from the outset. This form of coercion does not rely on quick escalation to military action. Incremental coercion is less dependent upon the variables of method of punishment and sense of urgency than is the ultimatum or tacit ultimatum.

The fourth form of coercion is the limited threat. The limited threat is dependent only upon the variable of what to demand. The other three variables are absent. The limited threat employs a simple demand without a time limit or the signal of strong punishment for noncompliance.

The limited threat is two-stage process. First, a simple demand is issued. Secondly, an evaluation is made of the opponent for compliance. This form allows for the optimization of other inducements, such as face-saving concessions, before repeating the two-stage process.

Selecting a form of coercion is important because the

form provides clarity of purpose. A change in the form of coercion indicates that the original intent of coercion is no longer valid. A change in form indicates that the original coercion strategy failed and a new strategy is being sought.

#### **Task Three: See Your Opponent**

According to George, coercion strategy includes taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the target government. Many factors affect an adversary's behavior. Psychological, cultural, and political variables influence the decision making of an opponent. Coercion strategy matches ways and means with the actual realities of the situation. An adversary will not necessarily behave as we would if we were in their position. Coercion strategy facilitates seeing the opponent from the opponent's perspective. By seeing the opponent, coercion avoids prejudiced calculations based upon how we want to see the opponent.

#### **Task Four: Situational-Contextual Factors**

Situational-contextual factors facilitate flexible coercion strategy development and execution. According to George, coercion strategy adapts to the situation at hand. Domestic factors may prohibit some forms of coercion. Conversely, other factors may prescribe a form of coercion.

The four key tasks provide a blueprint for developing



coercion strategy. The blueprint predicts success or failure. However, Pape's research indicates that success in one situation does not determine success in another.<sup>27</sup> George cautions that the four key tasks are not in and of themselves the reason for success and failure. It is the judgement of the policy maker in executing the tasks that determines outcome.<sup>28</sup>

Both the dictionary and theory provided an academic description of coercion; however, empirical data can help develop a deeper understanding of coercion. What are some historical examples where the United States used military forces to back diplomacy? Vietnam and Bosnia provide two case studies. Vietnam provides an example of failure. Bosnia provides a more recent example of successful coercion. The historical examples illuminate the characteristics and the four key tasks of coercion.

#### **Coercion in Vietnam**

The United States attempted to coerce the government of North Vietnam during OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER, 2 March 1965 to 31 October 1968. According to author Mark Clodfelter, ROLLING THUNDER was an example of a coercion strategy failure.<sup>29</sup> ROLLING THUNDER was the Johnson Administration's air campaign to coerce the North Vietnamese government. The objective was to compel the North Vietnamese to cease support for the insurgency in South Vietnam and to negotiate

a settlement.<sup>30</sup> President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara selected targets in the White House.<sup>31</sup> They were personally ensuring fidelity in the diplomatic signals to the North Vietnamese because they felt that military officers were unable to do so. According to Pape, the most important and practical military instrument for coercing another government is air power.<sup>32</sup> President Johnson's primary method of coercion during ROLLING THUNDER was through air power.<sup>33</sup> The object of the coercion was for the North Vietnamese to cease support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and negotiate a settlement.<sup>34</sup>

What made ROLLING THUNDER coercion and not another type of previously cited action? If ROLLING THUNDER were influence, then North Vietnam would have asked for the United States to bomb. A covert action campaign would have meant that the North Vietnamese were unaware of the United State's objective and action. ROLLING THUNDER could have been deterrence only if the United States was seeking to maintain the status quo in Vietnam. ROLLING THUNDER might have been an example of intervention if there was direct involvement and application of pain. The coercion campaigns applied limited military power. According to Clodfelter, the United States sought only to signal its resolve to continue inflicting pain upon North Vietnam until that government changed its behavior. The author Wallace Theis

states that ROLLING THUNDER is an example of failed coercion.<sup>35</sup> Do the four key tasks of coercion derive the same result?

The first task determines the strategy variables. According to Theis, the Johnson Administration's demand on the North Vietnamese was to cease support of the insurgency and negotiate a settlement.<sup>36</sup> The demand was clear and succinct. However, a "slow but inexorable barrage" was a poor method of creating a sense of urgency in the opponent.<sup>37</sup> The gradual escalation of air strikes failed to perpetuate the threat of ever-increasing levels of punishment. The North Vietnamese easily absorbed the punishment. The North Vietnamese knew that one air strike would be no worse than the next. Finally, the Johnson Administration failed at using other methods of inducement to complement the air strikes.<sup>38</sup> The Administration's position was simple. Bombing would continue. Bombing would stop only if the North Vietnamese would begin negotiations.

The second key task was determining the form of coercion. The form of coercion was the most potent form, the classic ultimatum.<sup>39</sup> According to Theis, the United States believed that they could signal "firmness and resolve by deed as well as by word."<sup>40</sup>

The third key task was seeing the opponent. Perhaps this task was the Johnson Administration's biggest

failure.<sup>41</sup> The Administration erroneously continued air strikes against conventional bombing targets in North Vietnam. However, the fundamental nature of the war was a guerilla war in South Vietnam. Threatening to bomb conventional targets near Hanoi did not convince the North Vietnamese to comply with the Administration's demands.

The fourth key task was determining situational and contextual factors. This key task was also a failure of tremendous magnitude.<sup>42</sup> The Johnson Administration used coercion only in a manner acceptable to American public opinion. Domestic politics kept American military power at minimal levels. The Administration was not willing to implement more intense means of coercion. They did not want to provoke China's involvement into Vietnam. The Johnson Administration failed to determine a method of coercion that would be both effective against North Vietnam and yet not provoke China's involvement. One author forecasted in 1965 that eliminating the linkage between military action in Vietnam and provoking China's involvement was essential. Thomas Schelling, at the time the acting director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, said that it "would be wise to de-couple" any action against North Vietnam that results in stimulating China's involvement.<sup>43</sup>

Poor execution of several key tasks, and not just one, is at the heart of the failure of ROLLING THUNDER. The key

tasks of coercion accurately predict coercion failure. What is a more recent example of coercion success?

### **Coercion in Bosnia**

On 30 August 1995, NATO began OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE to coerce the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina following a much publicized mortar attack in Sarajevo on 28 August. During OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, over three thousand air sorties were flown by eight NATO member nations. NATO flew the strikes at the request of the United Nations (UN).<sup>44</sup> The campaign's objective was to deny the Bosnian Serbs the capacity to ward off future NATO air strikes and to prevent their ability to mount a coordinated and sustained military campaign.<sup>45</sup> The strikes were against specific targets in and near weapon exclusion zones. Land power was also a component of OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE.<sup>46</sup> First, the UN Rapid Reaction Force fired hundreds of artillery rounds at Serb targets around Sarajevo. Second, the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation took advantage of the operation. In attacks that were uncoordinated with and conducted separately from OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE, militia and army units attacked Serb positions and seized territory in northern and western Bosnia.

OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE is given much of the credit for coercing the Bosnian Serbs, and the government of Yugoslavia and its President Slobodan Milosevic in

particular, to attend the proximity meetings at Dayton, Ohio in November 1995.<sup>47</sup> Richard Holbrooke believed that the combination of OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE and the timely ground offensive of the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation were important coercive elements. He stated that "clearly, the Croat-Muslim offensive in the west and the bombing were having a major effect."<sup>48</sup> Holbrooke believed that Milosevic was convinced that NATO was flying close air support for the Croat Bosnian-Serb Federation.

Why was OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE coercion? A covert action would have meant that President Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb Army were completely unaware of stated NATO and UN desires. They would have been ignorant of both the air strikes and the success of the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation. Intervention would have meant the direct involvement within the sovereign governments using any combination of military, economic, or diplomatic power. OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE limited air strikes to distinct areas. The strikes were modulated to obtain limited objectives. OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE was compelling the Bosnian Serbs to understand that it was in their own best interests to comply. Coercion promises continued and increasing levels of pain for noncompliance. OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE would have been influence only if the Bosnian Serb Army was seeking NATO's help. Finally, the

action could have been deterrence only if the UN and NATO were actively seeking to maintain the status quo.

The author Larry Wentz said that OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE is an example of successful coercion strategy in a complex multinational setting.<sup>49</sup> Do the four key tasks predict the success of OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE? The objective of OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE was to force a negotiated settlement ending the war in the Balkans. The continual destruction of air defense, communication, ammunition depots, and other military targets imposed a sense of urgency upon the Serbs. The Serbs simply needed to comply with already defined weapon exclusion zones for the coercion to cease. As previously cited, the method of punishment had air and land components. Inducements during OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE consisted of continued NATO negotiations with the warring parties in order to identify additional incentives and concessions.<sup>50</sup>

The form of coercion in OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE was tacit ultimatum. NATO leveraged flexibility by using the tacit ultimatum. NATO strikes were initially retaliation against a Serb mortar attack with the limited goal of enforcing weapons exclusion zones. However, NATO extended the goal of coercion. Air strikes continued in order to limit Serb ability to mount further coordinated military actions and campaigns.

NATO was able to see the opponent. NATO and the UN correctly understood that Slobodan Milosevic had "wrestled from Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic" the right to represent Bosnian Serb interests.<sup>51</sup> Milosevic was the opponent's leader since August 1995. Holbrooke stated that the "biggest mistake is to think Pale Serbs were rational."<sup>52</sup> Holbrooke negotiated with only one person representing Serbian interests, Milosevic. Holbrooke avoided the difficult task of having to engage in negotiations with many different Bosnian Serb leaders, commanders, and politicians.

NATO was successful at determining situational and contextual factors. Air strikes continued during the negotiations to compel all parties to come to agreement. Coercion relied heavily upon leveraging Milosevic's leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. The negotiation process was highly applauded by the European community. The negotiations used a balanced approach. All warring parties were treated as equals without explicitly blaming or excluding Bosnian Serbs in the peace process.<sup>53</sup>

Successful execution of the key tasks of coercion is at the core of the success of OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE. The key tasks of coercion serve as a blueprint for successful coercion. What are some additional facts that Vietnam and Bosnia reveal about coercion?



## Summary

Several important facts emerge from the analysis of coercion concerning air and land power. First, air power is an often-used military component in pursuing a strategy of coercion. Air power was a coercive element of military power in OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER and OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE. In fact, Pape states that the most important and practical military instrument for coercing another government is air power.<sup>54</sup> Theis believes that ROLLING THUNDER actually amplifies the dogmatic arguments of air power enthusiasts. His assertion is that air power enthusiasts posit that ROLLING THUNDER would have worked if left to its own devices. In their mind, coercion and the guiding hand of the Johnson Administration limited air power's decisive combat power. Therefore, air power enthusiasts mistakenly confuse the measured role of air power operating within the context of coercion with the unconstrained role of decisive air power in a combat role.<sup>55</sup> From the perspective of the air power enthusiast, land power appears to have only a small role in coercion.

Another important fact is that land power can actually apply coercive pain to a target government in two ways: fire and maneuver. The UN used indirect artillery fire around Sarajevo to coerce the Bosnian Serbs. The Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation's militia and army units coerced the

Bosnian Serbs by maneuvering to conquer territory in western Bosnia and Croatia.

Another important fact that emerges from the analysis of Vietnam and Bosnia is that coercion is a vitally important strategy for the United States. Coercion's role was pivotal in both Vietnam and Bosnia. Theis states that the failure of ROLLING THUNDER was a "horrendously bad deed" and that President Johnson "lead his country into a land war in Asia while deceiving Congress and the public about his intentions."<sup>56</sup> The success of coercion in Bosnia leads directly to the Dayton Peace Accords. According to Holbrooke, Milosevic was ready for peace only after the "Croat-Bosnian Muslim military forces enjoyed their best week since the war began."<sup>57</sup> Holbrooke stated that the Pale Serbs were not rational people who understood negotiation and compromise. They only understood coercion; "they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it."<sup>58</sup>

Finally, the civilian leadership of the United States employs coercion. The US military is simply a component that backs diplomacy by threat of punishment. Therefore, diplomacy drives the employment of the military in coercion strategy. Does military doctrine reflects this crucial relationship?

## CHAPTER THREE

### COERCION AND US MILITARY DOCTRINE

The threat of military punishment is a fundamental component of coercion. Military "doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding".<sup>59</sup> What is the role of coercion in United States Joint and Army doctrine? Does military doctrine explain the US Army's subordination to diplomacy during coercion?

#### **US National Security, Strategy**

The President identifies the United State's international objectives. The US National Security Strategy (NMS) is a statement of the nation's strategy for enhancing security, promoting democracy, and bolstering America's economic prosperity.<sup>60</sup> The NMS is the capstone document that the US military uses to link American international objectives with military doctrine.

The NMS alludes to the use of coercion as a component in obtaining international objectives. The NMS never emphatically states that coercion is a vital strategy. The NMS simply implies coercion's importance. However, the NMS specifically discusses two other actions to obtain international objectives: deterrence and intervention. The NMS states the importance of deterring America's enemy from acts of "aggression and coercion" against the United

States.<sup>61</sup> The NMS states that deterrence is most effective against most other conventional and nuclear threats.<sup>62</sup> Intervention is a viable action when "there is reason to believe that our action can make a real difference."<sup>63</sup> The NMS identifies two of George's foreign policy arrows by name.

The NMS twice implies the importance of military power backing diplomacy. First, the NMS uses the term coercion as an action that an opponent uses against the United States.<sup>64</sup> The US military protects against coercion. Second, the NMS alludes to using coercion as the most effective means against non-traditional opponents such as "terrorist and criminal organizations".<sup>65</sup>

What is the final word on coercion? The NMS states that it is "critical" to have the "military wherewithal" to back diplomacy with force.<sup>66</sup> In this context, coercion is a strategy that the US will use; however, a clear and precise statement cannot be found in the NMS. Does the vague description of coercion extend into US military doctrine?

#### **US Joint Military Doctrine**

Coercion's role is poorly translated from the NMS into military doctrine. Doctrine is "the building material for strategy" and is "fundamental to sound judgement".<sup>67</sup> Joint military doctrine is just below the NMS in the hierarchy of doctrine. The United State's capstone Joint military

publication alludes to coercion's importance without emphatically stating that fact.<sup>68</sup> Joint Publication 1 is just as vague about coercion as is the NMS.

Joint doctrine is far more specific concerning deterrence. Joint Publication 1 states that the first role of the military is deterrence of an opponent.<sup>69</sup> The second role of the military is "winning the nation's wars" should deterrence fail.<sup>70</sup> Joint Publication 1 describes one of the arrows in the foreign policy quiver.

The majority of Joint Publication 1 focuses discussion on campaign design. The objective of a campaign is "the employment of overwhelming military force" in order to defeat the opponent.<sup>71</sup> There are no specific statements on coercion's role within a military campaign. However, Joint Publication 1 contains a loophole that permits the design of campaigns in support of coercion strategy. It stipulates that "the campaign supports national strategic goals" and its design is therefore "heavily influenced by national military strategy".<sup>72</sup> This statement hints at the possibility of designing a campaign that backs civilian diplomacy with military power. Does the vague description of coercion in Joint doctrine extend into US Army doctrine?

#### **US Army Doctrine**

"The US Army is a doctrine-based organization".<sup>73</sup> The US Army's doctrine is derived through the hierarchy of NMS

and then Joint military doctrine. Field Manual 100-1, the Army's capstone document on doctrine stipulates that the US Army has two roles. The US Army's first role is to gain victory on the battlefield through the application of maximum available combat power.<sup>74</sup> The US Army's second role is to perform tasks in operations other than war.<sup>75</sup>

US Army doctrine alludes to coercion in operations other than war. Field Manual 100-5, the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine, states that at the point where "diplomatic influence alone fails to resolve the conflict" then "persuasion" is an option.<sup>76</sup> However, the manual cautions that at the point military force backs diplomacy then the likelihood of the conflict escalating to a more intense environment is very likely. The manual describes the types of conflict in operations other than war that is conducive to coercion strategy. Two examples are the strike and raid. The strike and raid is a form of the limited application of US Army land power.

What is the Army's final word about coercion? Field Manual 100-5 emphatically states that land power is the "proven decisive military force."<sup>77</sup> The other branches of service work alongside to support the Army's quest for decisive land combat. Also, the manual provides a translation of the meaning of the NMS to guide the employment of Army forces.<sup>78</sup> The manual reinforces the

perceived role of the Army as the premier decisive force. The manual omits coercion. Coercion is not a part of the Army's doctrine.

#### **Weinberger-Powell Criteria**

Formal military doctrine omits coercion; a well-known informal doctrine excludes it. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine is a list of criteria for the use of military forces abroad.<sup>79</sup> On 28 November 1984, Secretary of State Casper Weinberger announced his six-point doctrine in a speech at the National Press Club. The doctrine's objective was to prohibit the State Department from constantly calling upon military force to solve diplomatic problems. The Weinberger-Powell criterion is appropriate for major wars or protracted conflict with an opponent.<sup>80</sup> It is a prescription for overwhelming victory. It protects the United States from becoming embroiled in another Vietnam. The Weinberger-Powell criterion allows the "use of military forces as a political instrument" only when strategy is carefully thought out. It guides the decisive use of the military; it prohibits the application of limited military power when vital national interests are not at stake.

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine ignores coercion. The creation of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine derives from a perceived need to oppose or prevent the use of military force in coercion. Jeffery Record, an author and former

professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, states that the Weinberger-Powell doctrine prevents the US Army from significantly contributing to any coercion strategy.<sup>81</sup> The Public Television series Frontline reported that the Weinberger-Powell doctrine adversely affected the military's capability to effectively implement coercion in Bosnia during OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE.<sup>82</sup>

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine ignores coercion; some little-known informal doctrine supports the use of military force in coercion. Informal coercion doctrine began in the diplomatic realm. George states that coercion was more closely linked to Secretary of State George Shultz.<sup>83</sup> According to George, Shultz observed that there was a need to back diplomacy with a discrete measure of power when the objectives were limited in nature. "Diplomatic efforts not backed by credible threats of force and, when necessary, with use of limited force will prove ineffectual."<sup>84</sup>

In 1996, new informal doctrine began including coercion. Anthony Lake, at the time the Clinton Administration's National Security Advisor, provided a new set of "principles on the use of force".<sup>85</sup> Lake's principles contradicted the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Lake believed in using military force in coercion campaigns. Lake stated that "threatening to use force can achieve the same results as actually using it."<sup>86</sup> When the threat



failed and military force must be used, then "the selective but substantial use of force" is "more appropriate than its massive use."<sup>87</sup> Lake cited OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE in Bosnia as an example of the successful use of his principles for coercion.<sup>88</sup>

Formal doctrine cannot provide the US Army an intellectual framework from which to understand coercion. Informal doctrine mires the US Army in its quest for seeking the decisive role in military operations. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine prohibits clear insight into coercion strategy. How well did the US Army contribute in Kosovo without an intellectual or doctrinal foundation explaining coercion?

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **COERCION IN KOSOVO**

"War is a matter of vital importance to the State. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied".<sup>89</sup> Measuring success in Kosovo provides a study of the relevance of land power in a campaign founded on a strategy of coercion. How well did NATO accomplish the four key tasks of coercion?

#### **Task One: Determine Strategy Variables**

The most important variable is to determine what to demand on the opponent. The original demands of OPERATION

ALLIED FORCE were radically different than those that were eventually accepted.<sup>90</sup> The demands upon Yugoslavia and President Milosevic continually changed during the course of the operation. The examination of the changing demands starts at the origin of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

Coercion began when Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright threatened military punishment upon Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) if they refused the Rambouillet peace plan.<sup>91</sup> The Rambouillet document included important demands such as NATO remaining the ultimate authority, unrestricted movement of NATO peacekeepers throughout Yugoslavia, and a stipulation for a referendum in three years to determine Kosovo's autonomy.<sup>92</sup> The KLA eventually agreed to Rambouillet. Yugoslavia rejected it. Rambouillet represents the initial demands of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. The Rambouillet document is diplomacy backed by threatened military punishment. Rambouillet was the immediate reason for coercion.

The first change to the original demands of Rambouillet came from the United States. On 24 March 1999, White House spokesman Joe Lockhart stated that the reason for OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was to stop ethnic cleansing.<sup>93</sup> This statement obscures coercion's original Rambouillet demands. Mr. Lockhart's statement simply fosters favorable American public opinion support for bombing.<sup>94</sup> The statement does

not include mention of the Rambouillet demands at all. Therefore, the purpose of coercion in Kosovo was inconsistently presented to the American public right from the beginning.

The next change of demands came in an announcement from President Clinton later that same day.<sup>95</sup> In his address to the nation, President Clinton stated that if Milosevic continued to refuse to sign Rambouillet then NATO will "do what we must do", which is to back Rambouillet diplomacy with force.<sup>96</sup> NATO would begin military punishment unless "Serbian political and military leadership change course".<sup>97</sup> President Clinton's statement added two new demands in addition to the original demands from Rambouillet. The two new objectives were to deter Belgrade from increasing its offensive against Kosovar Albanians and to damage Belegarde's capacity to take repressive action. NATO's reason for coercion was now focusing on the humanitarian concerns of the Kosovar Albanian refugees.<sup>98</sup>

NATO's new reason for coercion, bombing to protect Kosovar Albanians, was "a miserable failure".<sup>99</sup> NATO could not stop the exodus of over a half million refugees from Kosovo to Albania. In Kosovo, over 700,000 internally displaced persons were running for their lives. Countless murders, rapes, and summary executions do not add up to successful coercion. Therefore, NATO had to change its

demands once again. Coercion was failing.

The most significant shift in determining what to demand of Yugoslavia occurred on 12 April 1999. On this date, NATO signaled to Yugoslavia the willingness to significantly depart from the Rambouillet demands.<sup>100</sup> A new peace framework would now suffice. NATO's new demands were significantly different than the original Rambouillet demands in three ways. First, an "international" military presence instead of solely NATO's presence was now acceptable.<sup>101</sup> Second, a peace framework "on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords" and not in compliance with them was now acceptable.<sup>102</sup> Finally, an agreement under the auspices of the United Nations instead of NATO control was also acceptable.

NATO attempted to build a political consensus to act upon the new demands on 24 April 1999. The NATO summit, originally a celebration of the organization's first fifty years, turned into gridlock.<sup>103</sup> NATO was unable to craft new strategies or operations to enhance the coercive effects of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.<sup>104</sup>

NATO finally achieved a breakthrough in a building political consensus for new demands. The G-8 adopted general principles for a political solution in Kosovo that mirrors NATO's demand change of 12 April 1999. Therefore, a surrogate organization gained a political consensus for

NATO. NATO was successful at changing their demands without the political consequence of having to admit their coercion was failing.

There are three important differences between the G-8 plan and the Rambouillet document. The differences "were of such magnitude that they could only be described as a concession to Milosevic".<sup>105</sup> The first was that peacekeeping remained under the auspices of the UN and not NATO. Second, peacekeepers were restricted to Kosovo and were not permitted throughout Yugoslavia. Finally, the provision for a referendum concerning Kosovo's independence was absent.

The formal acceptance of changing demands occurred in late May and early June 1999. First, Belgrade signaled its acceptance of the G-8 peace framework on 30 May 1999.<sup>106</sup> The Yugoslavia Parliament approved the G-8 peace plan on 3 June 1999.<sup>107</sup> Secondly, NATO and Russia jointly agreed to the G-8 framework on 6 June 1999.<sup>108</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1244 ratified the G-8 peace framework on 10 June 1999. This marked the day that NATO finally stopped changing demands.

The next two variables are to determine how to create a sense of urgency and method of punishment. NATO initially failed to create a sense of urgency upon Yugoslavia for compliance with Rambouillet.<sup>109</sup> NATO publicly declared its intention of limiting itself as to the available method of inflicting punishment on Yugoslavia. Land power was ruled

out from the beginning.<sup>110</sup> Air power alone could not instill a sense of urgency upon Milosevic for the first six weeks of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.<sup>111</sup>

The primary reason that land power was ruled out rests with the US Army. Although the White House was politically unwilling to commit ground forces, the US Army insisted on using ground troops only in accordance with the Weinberger-Powell approach.<sup>112</sup> Decisive and overwhelming force are a last resort only when all diplomatic efforts fail according to the doctrine. Therefore, limited coercion should continue threatening military punishment until a decisive land component is absolutely necessary. Land power was unable to contribute to creating a sense of urgency during the initial phase of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE due to the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.<sup>113</sup>

NATO was effective at creating a sense of urgency and determining a method of punishment beginning in mid-May 1999.<sup>114</sup> NATO doubled its airforce strength and tripled its strike mission rate.<sup>115</sup> NATO established a threat of land power by positioning forces along Kosovo's borders. Also, the Kosovo Liberation Army may have inadvertently assisted NATO by gaining success against Yugoslavia in Kosovo, similar to the example of the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation in Bosnia.<sup>116</sup>

Task Force Hawk marks the point where land power became

relevant in mid-May 1999. The preliminary plan was to attack into Kosovo with 175,000 NATO troops, "mostly through a single road from Albania".<sup>117</sup> Task Force Hawk was the US Army's contribution to this invasion force.<sup>118</sup> The task force included over five thousand soldiers, twenty-four Apache helicopters, Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS), and logistical support. NATO and Task Force Hawk contributed to coercion only through its physical presence near the Kosovo border. Land power did not fire a single shot or conquer any territory. NATO persistently pursued a ground invasion plan option from mid-May right up to the third of June 1999; the day Milosevic signaled his willingness to accept the G-8 peace plan.<sup>119</sup>

Inducements were far more coercive than the method of punishment or sense of urgency variables.<sup>120</sup> Two inducements were effective at enhancing coercion strategy during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. First, NATO signaled to Yugoslavia that terms short of those stipulated in the Rambouillet document would be acceptable. Second, Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari were "firmly insisting" that Milosevic accept the G-8 peace plan.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, inducements were crucial in coercing Milosevic to accept a peace plan. Yugoslavia was induced due to the waning strategic support of its friends, the Russians, coupled with a peace document that had a distinct

tone of concession in its wording.

#### **Task Two: Select the Form of Coercion**

The form of coercion during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE changed commensurate with determining what to demand. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE began with one form and ended using another form. Initially, the form of coercion was the limited form. Air strikes were launched with "the hope" that after one or two nights Milosevic would decide that Rambouillet "sounded pretty good".<sup>122</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies faulted NATO for merely "attaching" a threat of punishment to diplomacy.<sup>123</sup> NATO's two-stage methodology was to bomb and then wait and see what Milosevic would do.

This is the classic definition of limited coercion. The Clinton Administration was being compared to the Johnson Administration losing the limited war in Vietnam.<sup>124</sup> A new form of coercion was sought. In mid-May, NATO selected incremental coercion as their new form.<sup>125</sup> Both air and land power was increased incrementally. First, the average number of strike sorties increased from 150 to 450.<sup>126</sup> Second, General Clark notes that it was only in the final days of the eleven-week campaign that land power provided coercive effects on Milosevic.<sup>127</sup> Weinberger-Powell doctrine guided the employment of all forces during this period.<sup>128</sup> The ground force in the Balkans during the majority of the



campaign consisted of 16,000 NATO troops in Macedonia and 7,000 in Albania.<sup>129</sup> NATO announced on May 25, 1999 that they would increase this force to 28,000 troops.<sup>130</sup> General Clark's invasion plan called for a total of 175,000 NATO troops.

### **Task Three: See Your Opponent**

NATO failed to correctly perform coercion's key task of seeing your opponent. NATO began OPERATION ALLIED FORCE based upon a miscalculation of the opponent.<sup>131</sup> NATO did not recover from their failure to see the opponent until April 1999. NATO thought that OPERATION ALLIED FORCE would be a quick and easy operation. Secretary of State Albright thought that all objectives would be met "in a relatively short time".<sup>132</sup> The Clinton Administration's miscalculation of Milosevic's will received a tremendous amount of criticism.<sup>133</sup> Perhaps the greatest miscalculation was to underestimate the savagery of Milosevic's offensive against the Kosovar Albanians once NATO bombing began.<sup>134</sup>

Statements by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicate NATO's shift in seeing the opponent. Initially on 24 March 1999, she said, "I don't see this as a long term operation".<sup>135</sup> Then in April, her perceptions changed when she said, "We never expected this to be over quickly".<sup>136</sup> Her statements are indicative of the initial confusion and subsequent recovery in seeing the opponent.<sup>137</sup>

#### **Task Four: Situational-Contextual Factors**

NATO was able to adapt to the situation at hand. NATO was successful at determining situational and contextual factors during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.<sup>138</sup> NATO eventually used two separate coercion campaigns in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. NATO failed at backing diplomacy with force during the first phase of the operation. The historian John Keegan notes that the first six weeks had virtually no impact.<sup>139</sup> Limited coercion was not working. The situation in Kosovo was at best a stalemate until mid-May 1999. When NATO recognized that the first six weeks of the campaign were having little or no effect, they shifted strategy and had much greater coercive effects beginning in mid-May.

An important situational and contextual factor of the first half of the operation was to keep the NATO alliance together and acting in unison.<sup>140</sup> NATO was successful at accomplishing this critical factor. NATO stumbled but held firm primarily due to the leadership of the United States.<sup>141</sup>

NATO successfully performed other situational and contextual factors during the first half of the operation. NATO treatment of the Kosovar Albanian refugees was both compassionate and commendable.<sup>142</sup> The Clinton Administration won the battle for favorable public opinion in support of the bombing.<sup>143</sup> NATO's precision munitions were an attempt to limit coercion's destructive affects upon non-military

targets.<sup>144</sup> NATO attempted to minimize losses to foster favorable public opinion for the bombing.<sup>145</sup>

During the second half of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, NATO achieved its greatest success in determining situational and contextual factors.<sup>146</sup> NATO recognized that OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a stalemate by mid-May 1999. NATO's co-opting of the G-8 peace plan, and the subsequent public affairs campaign to claim it as their own, was an effective means of replacing one set of coercion demands with another. NATO changed demands without admitting initial failure.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Is land power a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion? OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a campaign consisting of two separate coercion strategies. In order to answer the research question, a summary and review of land power's role in both halves of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE is required.

Coercion failed during the first half of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. A change in the form of coercion signals failure. The limited coercion campaign failed to compel Milosevic to accept NATO's original terms. NATO selected a new form, incremental coercion, in mid-May 1999.

Would limited coercion have worked if land power was present during the first half of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE? Land power was absent during the first six weeks and present during the later stages of the campaign. In Bosnia, the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation helped to coerce Milosevic with land power. From this perspective, the decision not to use land power earlier in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a mistake. General Clark was Holbrooke's military advisor in Bosnia during OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE. He was ideally situated to see the positive effects of land power coercion upon Milosevic's decision making. Those lessons could have been transferred to operations in Kosovo. Land power was present during the second half of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Beginning in mid-May, land power was a relevant component of incremental coercion in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.<sup>147</sup> Milosevic was convinced that ground forces would invade Kosovo. Land power was backing diplomacy with force.

Land power is a relevant component in obtaining goals and objectives in a strategy of coercion. The use of coercion against Milosevic in the Balkan Peninsula indicates that the form of coercion is irrelevant. Limited land power can back diplomacy regardless of the form of coercion. Milosevic was coerced, at least in part, by land power in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The form of coercion in Bosnia was the tacit ultimatum. The mid-May form in Kosovo was

incremental. Both forms were successful. As previously cited, the success of coercion in one case does not necessarily predict its success in another. However, coercion in both Bosnia and Kosovo was enhanced through the relevance of land power.

There is a new perspective in which to understand the Weinberger-Powell criteria. Weinberger-Powell is appropriate for more than major wars; it is also appropriate for directing the employment of land power as a component of coercion strategy. Credible land power coerced Milosevic during the second half of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. During this second half of the campaign, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine guided the employment of land power. Conversely, the criterion was an obstacle during the initial six-week campaign of limited coercion. The early stages of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE provides an example of how Weinberger-Powell can hamper creative thought; the later stage of the operation is an example of how the doctrine optimizes force employment.

US military doctrine and US Army doctrine in particular needs to include the non-decisive use of force. Perhaps the most vividly clear aspect of coercion is that diplomacy dominates coercion strategy. History and theory illuminates the military's subordinate role. The military only backs diplomacy with force. Land power and air power are

subordinate to diplomacy. Therefore, neither branch of service is decisive in coercion campaigns. Diplomacy is the decisive factor in coercion campaigns. US Army doctrine needs to include defining its role in coercion.

Coercive diplomacy places a new demand on a military planner. Military planners need to understand the academic fundamentals of coercion. They then must optimize the coercive effects of their respective branch of service and stop the parochial quest for the decisive role. Only then will the US military, and the US Army in particular, correctly back diplomacy with force.

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## END NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Javier Solana, "NATO Press Conference," (transcript, 25 March 1999), NATO Homepage, available [www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990325a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990325a.htm) Dr. Solana, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Secretary General, announced the beginning of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE at 4:00 PM GMT on 25 March 1999. According to Dr. Solana, OPERATION ALLIED FORCE began "around" 9:00 PM GMT on 24 March 1999. According to him, the objective of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was "to halt the violence and to stop further humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo.

<sup>2</sup> John Keegan, "So The Bomber Got Through After All," London Daily Telegraph, (London, England), 3 June 1999; Dana Priest, "Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy," Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.), 21 September 1999. John Keegan writes that OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a "turning point" in history "when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by air power alone". In the third of a three part series of articles, Priest describes the "sharp divisions and frustrations" between Short and Gen. Clark. The article is from the three part series titled "The Commanders' War: The Battle Inside Headquarters".

<sup>3</sup> The Brookings Institution Home Page, "Scholars, Foreign Policy Studies," The Brookings Institution, available On-line [www.brookings.edu/scholars/idaalder.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/scholars/idaalder.htm), 9 Feb 00; Wesley K. Clark, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," Parameters Vol. XXIX, No. 4, (Winter 1999-2000), 3. Daalder's foreign policy expertise is in Eastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula. Daalder contributed many articles and papers to The Brookings Institution during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Daalder's supported a land power component of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. General Wesley K. Clark became the Supreme Allied Commander Europe on 11 July 1997. General Clark was the Commander of all allied forces during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

<sup>4</sup> Rick Atkinson, Crusade, The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 56-65. Atkinson provides insight into the parochial land power versus air power debate within the US military during OPERATION DESERT STORM.

<sup>5</sup> Defense Week, "Clark Looks Back on Kosovo Conflict," interview by Defense Week, Defense Week, 23 August 1999, 7. General Clark stated in the interview that "this (OPERATION ALLIED FORCE) is coercive diplomacy, diplomacy backed by

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force".

<sup>6</sup> Phillip J. Brooks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to the author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 February 2000. Dr. Brooks provided the cited comments to the author on the monograph prospectus.

<sup>7</sup> Clark, "The Way Ahead," 8. In his article, General Clark supports the premise that land power was more decisive than air power in achieving NATO's objective during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

<sup>8</sup> Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 13-16. George and Simons provide a comprehensive abstract model of coercion. According to George and Simons, coercion has an unlimited number of variables and countless combinations of factors. Their research indicates that coercive diplomacy takes many forms. Therefore, a model for coercion "is at best a quasi, incomplete deductive" model. Therefore, George and Simons states that the term "abstract model" is the most appropriate. A complete model cannot be made.

<sup>9</sup> Webster's New World Dictionary, Second Concise Edition, edited by David B. Guralnik, 145. The definition of coerce is in three parts: to curb, to compel, and finally to enforce.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 10. George has written extensively on coercion since 1971. He has authored books studying coercion employed by the United States in Laos in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and against North Vietnam in 1965. George is professor emeritus of international relations at Stanford University. Simons consults at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. on international security policy

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 2. George and Simons use the term "coercive persuasion" interchangeably with "coercive diplomacy". Their point is to reinforce that coercion is primarily a threat and not an immediate leap to military action. An immediate leap to military action is not diplomacy; it is a declaration of war.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. The threat of punishment includes the escalation of the level of punishment. Therefore, coercion calls for the



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level, or threatened level, of pain to continually increase until the target government modifies its behavior.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. Coercion strategy is backing a demand with a threat of pain. The promise of pain is realized or threatened.

<sup>15</sup> Timothy R. Sample, "New Techniques of Political and Economic Coercion", in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, ed. Arnold Kantner and Linton F. Brooks, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 161. Sample has extensive experience in foreign policy and with coercion. He served sixteen years in the federal government in positions such as deputy negotiator to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, within the intelligence community, and executive director of the Director of Central Intelligence Nonproliferation Center.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. Sample specifies four types of action. They are coercion, intervention, influence, and covert actions. These actions attempt to change or modify a target government's behavior. The monograph's author has included a fifth type of action, deterrence. Unlike Sample's four types of action, deterrence attempts to maintain the status quo. Sample's actions are those that attempt to change the status quo.

<sup>17</sup> Clark, Defense Week, 7. The monograph's author believes that General Clark is well versed in the strategy of coercion. His quote is the exact definition found in nearly any academic study of coercive diplomacy.

<sup>18</sup> Michael D. Bayles, "A Concept of Coercion", in Coercion, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, (Chicago/New York: Atherton, Inc., 1972), 17. Bayles states that the only beneficial promise is to end the means of punishment. For example, bombing will end when the target government accepts another's will. Other promises of benefits are actually concessions to the target government.

<sup>19</sup> James G. Roche and George E. Pickett Jr., "Organizing the Government to Provide the Tools for Intervention", in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, ed. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 196.

<sup>20</sup> Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy," Frontline Homepage, available on-line 19 April 2000,

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www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.htm., 4. George believes that the United States confuses the failure of intervention in Somalia with coercion. He states that America's lack of resolve in Somalia "makes effective use of threats of force", (i.e. coercion), complicated and undermined.

<sup>21</sup> Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, (London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 4. Pape uses the study of air power as a vehicle for studying coercion. Therefore, Pape provides more of a study of air power supremacy than of diplomacy backed by force. Pape includes World War II bombing campaigns in Europe and Japan in his study of coercion. The monograph's author believes that Pape is mistaken in that these two campaigns were not backing diplomacy by force. They were examples of air power in war. It was not coercion.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 12. Deterrence attempts to maintain the status quo. The other four types of action attempt to change or modify a target government's behavior.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 16. Pape states that coercion forces the target to do the mental "calculus with regards to cost and benefit."

<sup>24</sup> George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2. George and Simons caution that the diplomat formulating the coercion strategy is the ultimate responsible agent for success or failure. A skilled diplomat uses the four key tasks to help craft a coercion strategy; an unskilled diplomat believes that the four key tasks will tell him what to think.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 16. George and Simons reinforce the notion that it is the diplomat who decides the elements of the four key tasks.

<sup>27</sup> Pape, Bombing to Win, 332-358. Pape studies examples of what he believes to be air power coercion. Pape begins with Britain-Germany in 1917 and concluding with Iraq-Israel 1991.

<sup>28</sup> George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 21.

<sup>29</sup> Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam, (New York: The Free Press, 1989),

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xi. Clodfelter is an associate professor of history at the US Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado. His study of coercion in ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I and II serves to warn air power enthusiasts to be more sensitive of the role of air power within the context of coercion strategy. Clodfelter is warning his Air Force Academy students to listen to air power enthusiasts with a critical ear. Clodfelter wants to eliminate dogmatic air power claims from the study of Vietnam.

<sup>30</sup> Pape, Bombing to Win, 350. Pape faults the Johnson Administration for trying to bomb conventional targets in North Vietnam in 1965. Like most scholars, Pape agrees with the premise that fundamental nature of the war in 1965 was a guerilla war in South Vietnam. Bombing conventional targets in North Vietnam had very little coercive effect on austere Viet Cong units operating in South Vietnam.

<sup>31</sup> H.R. McMasters, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 95-96. McMasters believes that McNamara thought that military officers were unable to perfectly signal the correct diplomatic message. McNamara thought that a statesman, and not a soldier, is better at coercion. McMasters contends that McNamara had believed this since the Cuban Missile Crisis and his first hand experience in the handling of that situation.

<sup>32</sup> Pape, Bombing to Win, 55.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 351.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 350.

<sup>35</sup> Wallace J. Theis, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1980), 375.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 82. Coercion was therefore aimed at getting the North Vietnamese to stop encouraging the Viet Cong.

<sup>37</sup> Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 59.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>40</sup> Thies, Coercion and Diplomacy, frontispiece.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 399-406. Thies concludes that the Johnson Administration was fundamentally at fault for failing two key tasks. Task Three is the first of the two failures.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 376-399. Task Four is Thies' second of two tasks that were fundamentally flawed.

<sup>43</sup> Thomas C. Shelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 62. The monograph's author finds it highly ironic that Shelling forecasted the criticality of eliminating the potentiality of China's involvement as early as 1965. OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER was not yet complete. However, one of Robert McNamara's fellow Harvard Business School "Whiz-Kids", Shelling, was already criticizing the coercion campaign as fundamentally flawed.

<sup>44</sup> Larry Wentz, ed., Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997), 23. The US Department of Defense authorized the collaborative study of IFOR in Bosnia. The monograph's author was interviewed by the National Defense University from December to February 1995-1996. The interviews took place in Zagreb and Sarajevo. The author provided information concerning NATO's communication network. The author believes, based on first hand knowledge of what was actually taking place in IFOR, that the National Defense University study is lacking in detail, insightful commentary, and critical editorial. It is essentially a public affairs product.

<sup>45</sup> William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 246. The monograph's author contends that Durch offers a more balanced treatment of OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE than does the National Defense University. The National Defense University ignores UN artillery and the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation ground offensive as viable elements of coercion.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 247. Unlike the National Defense University, Durch includes NATO air power, UN artillery, and the Croat Bosnian-Muslim Federation ground offensive as the three components of punishment.

<sup>47</sup> Wentz, UN Peacekeeping, 23. Wentz provides an academic study of coercion against Milosevic. Like Durch, Wentz avoids making dogmatic statements in favor of either air or land power.

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<sup>48</sup> Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 147. The monograph's author notes that the term "coercion" is absent from Holbrooke's index in the cited book.

<sup>49</sup> Wentz, UN Peacekeeping, 23.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 247.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>52</sup> Holbrooke, To End a War, 152. Holbrooke states that the Pale Serbs only understood one thing, punishment.

<sup>53</sup> Wentz, UN Peacekeeping, 246.

<sup>54</sup> Pape, Bombing to Win, 55. The monograph's author believes that many of Pape's case studies are about air power in war. Coercion is about air power backing diplomacy with limited force

<sup>55</sup> Theis, Coercion and Diplomacy, 375. Theis measures coercion's failure during ROLLING THUNDER and exposes both the valuable lessons learned and the fallacies created. Theis, Pape, and Clodfelter are all very critical of the Johnson Administration's failed coercion in Vietnam.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 408.

<sup>57</sup> Holbrooke, To End a War, 144.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 152.

<sup>59</sup> U.S., Department of the Navy, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1989), 43. This quote is used for an explicit reason. Doctrine is important to both branches of service that provide land power: The Marines and The Army.

<sup>60</sup> U.S. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1998), iii. The NMS states that enhancing security, promoting democracy, and bolstering economic prosperity are the core objectives of America's national military strategy.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 12. It is interesting to note that the NMS stipulates protection from coercion. It advocates defensive measures against an enemy who is attempting to coerce the

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United States. The NMS never reverses that line of logic and advocate using coercion against an enemy. The NMS omits offensive measures, or use of coercion, against the United States' opponents.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. This passage is the first source of evidence supporting the monograph's position that the NMS paragraph entitled "Military Activities" is talking around the subject of coercion.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 21. The passage "can make a real difference" is from the United States' perspective. Measurable "real difference" is to the benefit of American interests absent of a target government asking for our assistance. Hence this is intervention and not influence.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 12. The term "coercion" is used twice in the NMS paragraph entitled "Military Activities". In both cases, the NMS is speaking directly to defensive measures against an opponent who is attempting to use "aggression and coercion" against the United States.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. This passage of the NMS is the second source of evidence supporting the monograph's position that the NMS is alluding to using coercion in an offensive manner. This quote is from the NMS paragraph "Military Activities".

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 23. This passage is the closest that the NMS comes to specifically defining the term coercion commensurate with this monograph's fidelity. The NMS presents the need to "influence" an opponent with "diplomatic capabilities" backed by military force and an "economic base".

<sup>67</sup> Curtis E. Lemay, Quoted in Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Doctrine, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1984), frontispiece. The quote is used to display the importance of doctrine in the branch of service that holds the distinction of being, in Pape's words, the most well suited for coercion strategy: The US Air Force.

<sup>68</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: 1991 November 11). Joint Publication 1 guides the joint action of the Armed Forces of the United States. On page iii, Joint Publication 1 stipulates to all branches of service that they "must integrate the concepts and values presented in this publication".

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 1. Therefore, JP1 is stipulating that the military service's primary role is not in support of coercion but in support of deterrence.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 1. Therefore, JP1 is stipulating that fighting and winning wars is the military service's role in the event that deterrence fails.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 47. Therefore, JP1 is stipulating that campaigns are designed for employing decisive military force. The design of a campaign of coercion is omitted, but not specifically excluded.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 46. The monograph's author interprets this passage as alluding to coercion. Coercion campaigns can be designed if in fact the NMS desires the use of coercion, instead of decisive battle and war.

<sup>73</sup> U.S., Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1 The Army, (Washington, D.C., 14 June 1994), Forward. FM 100-1 is the Army's capstone document on doctrine. On page v, FM 100-1 states that "all other Army doctrine flows from the principles and precepts contained in this manual".

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 47. The US Army's capstone manual for doctrine stipulates the supremacy of decisive combat over operations other than war, commensurate with Joint doctrine's capstone manual for doctrine, Joint Pub 1.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> U.S., Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, (Washington, D.C., 14 June 1993), 2-1. FM 100-5 most nearly defines the term coercion commensurate with the fidelity of this monograph's definition of coercion. However, FM 100-5 never explicitly uses the term coercion.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 1-3 to 1-4. The manual provides a table that lists its interpretation of the NMS. Coercion is omitted; the decisive role of the US Army is included.

<sup>79</sup> Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York; Pocket Star Books, July 1992), 89. Woodward explains that the optimal use of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine was in Operation Desert Storm.

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<sup>80</sup> Jeffrey Record, "OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: Yet Another Wake-Up Call for the Army?," Parameters Vol. XXIX, 4, (Winter 1999), 18. Record's position is that the Weinberger-Powell criterion limits the intellectual ability of the US Army to contribute to coercion strategies.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 23. Record believes that the Weinberger-Powell doctrine paralyzed the US Department of Defense during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Record's position is that the doctrine prevented the US Army from finding new and optimal means for contributing to coercion because Weinberger-Powell excludes the use of military forces in operations other than war.

<sup>82</sup> Frontline, "Give War a Chance," (transcript, 11 May 1999), Frontline Homepage, available on-line 19 April 2000, [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/script.htm](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/script.htm), 9. According to Frontline, Richard Holbrooke represented "the antithesis" of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Frontline also states that Admiral Smith was "a true believer of the creed" of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. "The two men would clash fiercely and often, and the outcome of their personal battle" drove the nature of coercion in Bosnia.

<sup>83</sup> Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy," Frontline Homepage, available on-line 19 April 2000, [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.htm](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.htm), 2.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post Cold-War World." Frontline Homepage, available on-line 23 April 2000, [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/lake.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/lake.html), 1. In remarks at George Washington University on 6 March 1996, Lake cited "seven circumstances" where the use of military forces were appropriate. Lake's seven circumstances are in direct conflict with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 2. According to Lake, the "hardest" question to ask is how to use military force. Lake answers this question by stating his support for coercion. Lake states that backing diplomacy with a threat of force "has a unique ability to concentrate the minds of our adversaries without firing a shot."



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<sup>87</sup> Ibid. Lake is precisely stating George's definition of coercion where the method of military force is quite limited in nature.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 1-6. Lake's examples include Bosnia, Haiti, North Korea, and Iraq. In each case, Lake is expressing the dominant role that his seven principles now hold over the older and outdated Weinberger-Powell criteria.

<sup>89</sup> Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 63.

<sup>90</sup> Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure," Foreign Affairs Vol. 78, 5, (September/October 1999), 4. Mandelbaum states that OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a failure. Too many concessions were made to Milosevic. According to Mandelbaum, the concessions were of such magnitude that NATO's will was never imposed upon Milosevic.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> U.S., Department of State, Understanding the Rambouillet Accords, Fact sheet released by the Bureau of European Affairs, available On-line, <http://secretary.state.gov>, 7 February 2000. The author has used the US State Department's interpretation of the Rambouillet document as the authoritative version of what the document means to the US government.

<sup>93</sup> Defense Link (Washington, DC), 22 April 1999. Defense Link is the official U.S. Department of Defense American Forces Information Service. The author notes that Defense Link carefully kept in step with the changing demands of the United States and hence NATO. Defense Link is more of a Department of Defense public affairs tool than an independent news source concerned with presenting facts to the public.

<sup>94</sup> Charles Babington, "Clinton Sticks With Strikes As Poll Shows 51% In U.S. Approve," Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.), 30 March 1999. Babington notes that public opinion polls in favor of Clinton's impeachment were higher than any poll in favor of Clinton's handling of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Babington states that Clinton managed to obtain favorable, not overwhelming, public opinion support during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

<sup>95</sup> United Nations, Resolution 1244 (1999), available on-line

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2 July 1999, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). The Security Council, at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999, adopted UN Resolution 1244. The cited web page text is entitled "Full Text of the UN Resolution on Kosovo and Drafts 1830 GMT 990615."

<sup>96</sup> The White House, President Clinton's Address to the Nation, Washington, D.C., 24 March 1999. The author believes that the address is a mix of diplomatic language and public affairs statements. The address signals to Milosevic that the US intended to continue coercion. The address also includes statements on humanitarian concerns in order to foster public support in the U.S.

<sup>97</sup> Defense Link (Washington, DC), 22 April 1999.

<sup>98</sup> Michael Kelly, "Three Mistakes," Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.), 8 April 1999. Kelly believes that OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a failure based on three mistakes. First, Clinton and Albright mistakenly dreamt that bombing would bring Milosevic to his knees quickly and easily. Second, Clinton's promise to never use ground troops. Third, that Clinton miscalculated the scope and savagery of Milosevic's treatment of Kosovar Albanians after bombing commenced.

<sup>99</sup> The Brookings Institution Home Page, "The Kosovo War: Is There an Endgame?," The Brookings Institution, available On-line [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu), 14 April 1999, 11. A Brookings press briefing was held on 14 April 1999. Three distinguished Brookings panelists provided scholarly assessment of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. The panelists were Richard Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies; Ivo Daalder, Visiting Fellow Foreign Policy Studies; Michael O'Hanlon, Fellow Foreign Policy Studies.

<sup>100</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council Statement, 12 April 1999. Because U.S. policy is intertwined with NATO's, the author notes that the 12 April policy shift announced by NATO is difficult to ascertain if it is either a U.S. or a NATO position.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Stratfor.com, NATO Summit Generates Gridlock 24 Apr 99-1915 GMT, Available On-line, 2 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). The author believes that the actual political consensus of the summit was the strategy

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eventually implemented: change NATO demands, issue new demands through another party (G-8), back the new demands with a more credible threat.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Stratfor.com, So Close...Yet Still Not There 30 May 99 2025 GMT, Available On-line, 2 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). Stratfor reports that the United States never liked the G-8 accords. Stratfor believes that Germany and Italy forced the G-8 accords upon the United States because the coalition needed a way to get out of Kosovo. The G-8 accords were a method of quitting with grace.

<sup>107</sup> The Associated Press, Text of Kosovo Peace Plan Approved by Serb Parliament 1400 GMT 990603, translated by AP, available On-line, 2 July 1999, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). The author has chosen the AP translation. The author notes that the Yugoslavian and English versions of the peace plan are significantly different. Each side was able to use public relation's spin and declare a victory based on the changes between the two versions of the document. For Milosevic, he was able to state to his nation that Yugoslavia never accepted NATO's original Rambouillet demands. For NATO, the allies were able to state that Milosevic accepted because we bombed.

<sup>108</sup> Stratfor.com, The End: NATO's Strategic Confusion and Diplomatic Brilliance 1840 GMT 990619, Available On-line, 7 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). Stratfor reports that the reality of NATO quitting was transformed into victory through public relation's spin. The brilliance of NATO's leadership was to snatch victory from the jaws of stalemate.

<sup>109</sup> Earl H. Tilford Jr., "OPERATION ALLIED FORCE and the Role of Air Power," Parameters Vol. XXIX, 4, (Winter 1999-2000), 27.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., Tilford makes the argument that there is not enough military power to make-up for the mistaken diplomacy at Rambouillet initiated by Secretary Albright.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Record, "Wake-up," 17-18. Record is adamant in arguing that the US military "foot-dragging" was due to Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Record states that the US Army 'wanted

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nothing to do" with Kosovo. Record cites the Weinberger-Powell doctrine for the reason that "the Army remains intellectually and structurally mired in the Cold War."

<sup>113</sup> Joel Hayward, "NATO's War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Analysis," New Zealand Army Journal No. 21 (July 1999), 3-4. Hayward's position differs slightly from that of Record. According to Hayward, NATO's "miscalculation" was to ignore the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. Hayward states that the campaign was "conceived and conducted contrary to the so-called Powell doctrine." Therefore, Record and Hayward provide two complementary perspectives on the Weinberger-Powell doctrine in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Record states that the US Army's adherence to the doctrine made them drag their feet and not contribute to coercion; Hayward states that "NATO ignored" the doctrine and therefore failed to include a viable land component as part of the coercion.

<sup>114</sup> Priest, "Tension Grew,". Priest documents the dogmatic argument between the operation's air and land power enthusiasts, LTG Short and GEN Clark.

<sup>115</sup> Hayward, "NATO's War," 10. Hayward's analysis differs from Tilford in that air power was suitable for the form of coercion selected. However, Hayward believes that the air power was not optimized until mid-May 1999. Hayward's article supports the supremacy of air power over land power in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. He believes that air power could have won earlier if left to its own devices.

<sup>116</sup> Dana Priest, "A Decisive Battle That Never Was," Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.), 21 September 1999. As previously cited, this article is the first in Priest's three part series titled "The Commanders' War: The Plan to Invade Kosovo".

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Record, "Wake-Up" 17. Record supported the use of Task Force Hawk. He is critical of the US Army for not pushing the Administration for a Task Force Hawk sooner.

<sup>119</sup> Priest, "Decisive Battle,". Priest describes GEN Clark's efforts to convince NATO, The White House, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a land power component was required in order to achieve objectives in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Priest states that GEN Clark consistently presented the opinion that only land power could decisively successfully conclude the campaign.

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<sup>120</sup> Stratfor.com, The End: NATO's Strategic Confusion and Diplomatic Brilliance 1840 GMT 990619, Available On-line, 2 July 1999, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).

<sup>121</sup> Hayward, "NATO's War," 11.

<sup>122</sup> The Brookings Institution, "The Kosovo Crisis: NATO Strikes Serbia," The Brookings Institution, available On-line [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu), 29 March 1999. 3. This Brookings press release was on 29 March 1999. The three-member panel consisted of the same members as in endnote 85.

<sup>123</sup> Agence France-Presse, "NATO Conduct Of War Is Inept, Institute Finds," International Herald Tribune, (London, England), 5 May 1999. The International Institute for Strategic Studies is based in London. The Institute faults NATO for disregarding the principles of war. Their opinion is that the military power backing the diplomatic errors was never credible. The Institute also faults NATO for lacking the capacity to formulate complex diplomatic solutions for Kosovo.

<sup>124</sup> Bob Davis, "Some Hear Echoes of LBJ in Clinton's Kosovo Policy," Wall Street Journal, (New York), 1 April 1999.

<sup>125</sup> Clark, "The Way Ahead," 10. General Clark planned for gradual intensification from the inception of the air campaign.

<sup>126</sup> Tilford Jr., "OPERATION ALLIED FORCE," 30. Tilford documents air power's attempt to build a truly credible force and to solely conduct operations as it best sees fit.

<sup>127</sup> Associated Press, "Milosevic Had Intelligence He Would Face Ground Attack," Washington Times, (Washington: D.C.), 1 September 1999. In this interview, GEN Clark is defending the supremacy of land power over air power. He implies the land power was the decisive instrument that successfully ended OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. GEN Clark states that it was the threat of going into Kosovo by ground that finally compelled Milosevic to accept NATO's will.

<sup>128</sup> Hayward, "NATO's War," 5-10. Hayward states that NATO was initially "unprepared and woefully equipped" because they violated the Weinberger-Powell doctrine prior to May. Hayward describes how NATO "unleashed a veritable torrent of steel" on Serbia beginning in mid-May. This torrent of steel was in "keeping with the principles" that it had

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"previously ignored", i.e. adhering to the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.

<sup>129</sup> Stratfor.com, NATO and the Politics of Bluff 1330 GMT 990526, Available On-line, 7 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure," 5. Mandelbaum is extremely critical of both Albright and Clinton.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>133</sup> Hayward, "NATO's War," 2-3. Hayward is critical of both Albright and Clinton.

<sup>134</sup> Kelly, "Three Mistakes," 8 April 1999.

<sup>135</sup> Op Ed, "Earth to Albright," Washington Times, (Washington: D.C.), 17 June 1999. The Washington Times criticizes the inability of both Albright and Clinton to formulate complex diplomatic solutions to the situation in Kosovo. The Washington Times believes that Milosevic intellectually and politically outmatched both Albright and Clinton.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Rowan Scarborough and Andrew Cain, "GAO Cites Confusion in Kosovo Policy," Washington Times, (Washington: D.C.), 8 April 1999.

<sup>138</sup> Richard N. Haass, "The Use and Abuse of Military Force," The Brookings Institute, Available On-line, 15 November 1999, [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu). Entitled "Policy Brief Number 54-November 1999", Haass provides the official policy stance of The Brookings Institute, Foreign Policy Division concerning the outcome of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

<sup>139</sup> John Keegan, "Please Mr. Blair, Never Take Such a Risk Again," The Daily Telegraph, (London), 6 June 1999. Keegan is a leading air enthusiast who claims that air power alone decided the outcome of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.

<sup>140</sup> Clark, "The Way Ahead," 8. Clark states that the maintenance of the Alliance cohesion was no less important than other factors.

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<sup>141</sup> Stratfor.com, NATO's Victory 0430 GMT, 990621, Available On-line, 7 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).

<sup>142</sup> Stratfor.com, Strategic Analysis: Operation Broken Hammer 4 April 99-2150 GMT, Available On-line, 7 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com).

<sup>143</sup> Babington, "Clinton Sticks With Strikes As Poll Shows 51% In U.S. Approve," 30 March 1999.

<sup>144</sup> Clark, "The Way Ahead," 8. Clark states that even an inadvertent attack on a non-military target would undercut NATO's humanitarian legitimacy.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., Clark states that extraordinary steps were taken to avoid losses.

<sup>146</sup> Stratfor.com, NATO's Victory 0430 GMT, 990621, Available On-line, 7 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). and Text of Clinton's Address to the Nation on Kosovo 990610, Available On-line, 7 February 2000, [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). Stratfor reports that NATO did indeed win OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Diplomatic breakthrough and public relation's spin won the Operation.

<sup>147</sup> The Associated Press, "Milosevic Had Intelligence He Would Face Ground Attack," Washington Times, (Washington; D.C.), 1 September 1999.

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